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According to the French law, the short-time compensation (STC) program aims at avoiding 
redundancies during short-term downturns. Even if it does not shield establishments from 
redundancies (Calavrezo, Duhautois and Walkowiak, 2009a), STC can preserve an 
establishment’s survival. This paper studies the relationship between STC and establishment 
exit over the period 2000-2005. We merge six data sets and we test the relationship between 
STC and establishment exit with propensity score matching techniques. Our results show 
that, on average, the year after establishments implement STC, they exit the market more 
intensely than establishments that do not use the program. 
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1. Introduction 
According  to  French  the  law,  the  short-time  compensation  (STC)  program  is  an 
employment protection device because it aims to avoid redundancies during times of short-
term economic downturn or exceptional circumstances (for instance, disasters). Employers 
applying STC can temporarily reduce employee hours below the legal working time (for the 
entire establishment or a particular department within the establishment) or eliminate some or 
all of an employee’s job duties. STC allows employees to maintain a contractual bond with 
their employer. They receive a compensation for their wage loss that is partly paid by the 
State. STC exists under different forms in most developed countries: for example, the “Cassa 
Integrazione  Guadagni”  in  Italy,  the  “Kurzarbeitergeld”  in  Germany,  the  “Short-Time 
Compensation Program” in the United States, the “Work-Sharing Program” in Canada and the 
“Short-time Working” device in the United Kingdom. In France, the exact name of the device 
is “Chômage partiel” (partial unemployment). Nevertheless, in this paper, we decide to use 
the US term. Before the recent economic crisis, even if the STC program was more frequently 
used in Europe than in North America, it appeared in all countries as a “rare phenomenon.” 
On  average,  between  1995  and  2005,  STC  authorizations  affected  nearly  1%  of  French 
establishments and 2% of employees in the private sector, excluding agriculture (Calavrezo et 
al., 2009b). During the 1980’s in the US, there was similarly low STC participation, limited to 
less than 1% of employers. Since 2008, the economic crisis has amplified the use of STC 
programs, especially in Europe. 
From a theoretical perspective, the international literature identifies two co-existing 
STC  roles  (a  security  role  and  a  flexibility  role)  that  differentiate  North  American  and 
continental European systems (see the three main papers on this topic: Van Audenrode, 1994; 
Houseman and Abraham, 1993; Burdett and Wright, 1989). 3
Calavrezo et al. (2009b) investigate the flexibility role of STC between 1995 and 2005 
in France. Working time reduction (WTR) is a flexibility device with the initial objective of 
reducing unemployment through work-sharing. The most recent French WTR laws, in place 
from 1996 to 2002, provided for the implementation of working time devices, through which 
firms could use flexibility instruments that allow firms to use employee hours for varying 
tasks. The STC decree of June 28
th, 2001 was directly related to the WTR implementation. 
Since 2001, establishments have had to place a priority on the use of flexible working hours 
associated with WTR. Calavrezo et al. (2009b) show a “substitution” effect between WTR 
and STC over the 1995-2005 period. They quantify the average decrease in STC authorized 
days. Indeed, the flexibility part of the STC program seems to have collapsed: until 2000, 
STC was inversely correlated to economic growth, and after 2000, firms could no longer use 
STC as an internal flexibility instrument. This suggests that WTR has refocused the STC 
program away from its initial role of retaining employees. 
Consequently, the following question concerning STC recourse is proposed: is STC 
really a protection device? The empirical analysis of the security role of STC is focused on its 
relationship  to  redundancies.  We  can  analyze  the  relationship  between  STC  and  layoffs 
through  three  distinct  experiences:  the  European  experience  (Vroman,  1992),  the  US 
experience (Needels et al., 1997) and the Canadian experience (the Ekos research, 1993). On 
the whole, even if researchers have found that firms in both American and European systems 
are likely to use some combination of hour reductions and layoffs, the implications of STC on 
redundancies remains unclear. In a recent study, Calavrezo et al. (2009a) analyze the effect of 
the French STC program on redundancies using panel data models with a sample selection, 
endogenous explanatory variables  and unobserved  heterogeneity.  Calavrezo et  al.  (2009a) 
work with an unbalanced panel of more than 36,000 French establishments with at least 50 
employees.  Their results indicate  that STC seems to  significantly increase the number of 4
redundancies or the probability of layoffs. The authors state that STC seems to be inefficient 
according  to  this  employment  protection  criterion.  Nevertheless,  it  is  not  possible,  for 
instance,  to  conclude  definitively  that  STC  is  totally  inefficient  in  terms  of  employee 
protection. Even if STC cannot stop redundancies, it perhaps can prevent establishment exit. 
For  this  reason,  this  paper  questions  the  STC  program’s  efficiency  within  French 
establishments by investigating the relationship between the STC recourse and establishment 
exit  behavior  between  2000  and  2005.  The  contribution  of  this  work  is  twofold.  First, 
empirical analyses on the French STC program are very scarce in the literature; our topic is 
quite original, especially in terms of the evaluation of a public policy device. Second, we use 
a rich dataset. 
The  use  of  STC  among  French  establishments  is  not  randomly  distributed.  Thus,
selection  can  be  a  potential  problem  because  establishments  that  choose  to  have  STC 
authorizations might do it as a consequence of their internal strategy. To analyze the effect of 
the French STC program on establishment exit and to control for selection bias, we implement 
a  propensity  score  matching  methodology.  Different models  are  estimated  on  six  annual 
samples  obtained  from  the  matching  of  six  data  sources  that  contain  more  than 550,000 
observations. Our main result indicates that the year after establishments implement STC, 
they exit the market more intensely than those exiting establishments that do not use the 
program.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second Section describes STC 
regulations  in  France.  The  third  Section  presents  a  short  review  of  the  literature  on  the 
relationship between STC and establishment exit. The fourth Section presents the data. The 
fifth Section outlines our econometric approach and the sixth Section presents our findings. 
Finally, the conclusion in the seventh Section discusses the efficiency of the STC program in 
France.5
2. STC regulations in France
The French STC program is a legal instrument that aims at protecting employment and 
preventing  redundancies  in  cases  of  exceptional  circumstances,  by  allowing  firms  to 
temporarily reduce working time or suspend their business activities. STC can be applied for 
the following reasons: downturns in economic cycles; difficulties in the acquisition of raw 
materials  or  energy;  transformation,  restructuring  or  modernization  of  the  firm;  and 
exceptional natural disasters, among other types of difficulties. According to the law, the 
instrument should be used as a temporary tool.
STC can be considered a preventive economic assistance device in the sense that its 
main  objective  is  to  prevent  permanent  layoffs  of  employees  in  situations  of  temporary 
economic difficulties. Employees on STC continue to keep their contractual bond with the 
employer. A compensation system exists in order to indemnify employees’ salary losses due 
to STC. 
The STC regulation has changed twice recently: the first change occurred in 2001 after 
the implementation of the working time reduction policy, and the second change occurred in 
2008-2009 due to the economic crisis. As our period of analysis is 2000-2005, we exclusively 
concentrate on the description of the STC regulation before 2008. 
The decree of June 28
th,  2001 presents the STC regulation in connection with the 
WTR policy. In fact, STC recourse became conditioned by working time reduction policy 
application types. The role of this binding command is to refocus STC on its primary function 
of supporting employees in employment if the establishment confronts a short-term economic 
downturn. By implementing the working time reduction policy, overtime and STC no longer 
represent the only two solutions for an establishment wishing to adapt to the fluctuations of 6
activity. After the implementation of the STC binding command, establishments must use one 
of the devices related to the working time reduction policy.
The binding command of 2001 tries to clarify STC applicable procedures by changing 
three dimensions of the STC regulation: compensation (Section 2.1), allocation (Section 2.2) 
and refunds (Section 2.3). 
2.1 Compensation
The binding command modifies three levels of the STC compensation: the number of 
compensated hours, the amount of government support and the creation of a specific quota of 
compensated hours.
In firms with fixed working hours, compensated hours are calculated as the difference 
between  the  number  of  hours  that  are  supposed  to  be  worked  and  the  number  of  hours 
effectively worked during the month. With the decrease in legal working hours, the binding 
command of 2001 stipulates that STC is activated when hours worked are less than 35 hours 
per week, or below collective working hours (if it is inferior to the legal weekly limit). The 
binding command also defines the method for calculating compensated hours for the different 
devices  of  the  working  time  reduction  implementation.  Thus  the  compensation  varies 
according to the rules of WTR organization, for example, modulation of worked hours or 
“RTT days”. Some “unworked” hours might not be compensated, depending on the form of 
implementation of the working time reduction policy.
The minimum hourly STC compensation was established on February 21
st, 1968. It is
at least equal to 50% of the hourly gross pay. It corresponds to 4.42 euros per hour of STC 
compensation. The compensation for each hour on STC contains two elements. The first one 
is government support. The binding command of June 28
th, 2001 establishes a shifting rate for 
this support, according to firm size. This support rate didn’t depend on firm size before the 7
reform. Therefore, in firms with more than 250 employees, the government support is 2.13 
euros per hour. For other firms, the rate is 2.44 euros per hour. A lower STC compensation 
rate for big firms with at least 250 employees can be explained by the fact that big firms can 
more easily allocate working hours. When strong threats to employment exist, the government 
can pay a higher compensation rate. In 2005, government spending on STC amounted to 16.6 
million euros and generally fluctuated around 20 million euros during the years before 2005. 
The second element is support paid by the employer, which is the difference between the total 
amount of each STC hour (4.42 euros) and the government’s subsidy. In general, the amount 
equals 1.98 euros per hour for firms with less than 250 employees and equals 2.29 euros per 
hour otherwise. The STC compensation is exempted of from employer social contribution
taxes,  but  is  subjected  to  the  supplementary  social  security  contribution  and  to  the 
contribution to the repayment of social security debt. 
Since the 10
th of April, 2001, the State has been refunding firms within the maximum 
quota of 600 STC hours per employee per year, for all professional branches. The binding 
command  modifies  the  law,  such  that  in  cases  where STC  funds  are  used  to  modernize 
facilities and firm’s buildings, the quota is lowered to 100 hours. This number of hours is 
ascribed from the total quota of compensated hours. This change in the legislation was made 
because using STC to modernize facilities was sometimes contrary to the intentions of the 
measure: this kind of situation might lead to long periods of interruption of the business 
activities of the firm, which could result in the firm reaching total (maximum) STC
1, at which 
point work contracts end.
                                                
1 Total STC is a special situation of STC in which an employee is on STC more than four consecutive weeks. At 
that point, the work contract ends. 8
2.2 Allocation
The 2001 binding command contains a major change in terms of the allocation of 
STC
2. Firms that wish to take advantage of STC have to consult the plant’s works council and 
then apply for an authorization with the French administration at the “department level”
3. 
Asking for STC authorizations was not compulsory before the 2001 binding command. After 
using STC, employers must address a request for compensation to the French administration. 
On the other hand, the binding command stipulates that in case of inclement weather, the 
demand can be registered 30 days after the phenomenon. When the administration accepts the 
demand, each  month  the firm must send  the administration the amount to  be  reimbursed 
(firms  pay  the  employee  the  entire  amount).  The  binding  command  provides  a  special 
procedure  in the  case  where  firms  use  modulating  hours.  In  this  special case,  employers 
should inform the administration at the end of the year after having established accounting 
statements for modulating hours. If the firm does not comply with these procedures or if the 
administration rejects the request, the employer must pay “standard” wages. 
2.3 Refunds
After the change in the STC law, refund procedures contain new elements specifically 
related  to  the  different  forms  of  working  time  reduction  implementation.  The  firm  must 
indicate the main structure for allocation of work hours and must inform the administration if 
executives or migrant workers that have special working hour conditions are in the firm. In 
the  case  of  using  modulating  hours,  the  firm  has  to  provide  a  work  schedule  for  each 
employee once the accounting statement for modulating hours has been made. 
3 STC and establishment exit: a literature review
                                                
2 Some categories of employees are not eligible for STC benefits (for example, seasonally unemployed workers).
3 In France, the equivalent of the American county is called a “départment”. 9
In the economic literature, the relationship between STC and establishment exit is not
addressed theoretically or empirically. The only mention to this topic is presented by Blyton 
(1985). The author makes the following hypothesis: using STC during a sustained economic 
recession might delay an employer’s decisions, which can jeopardize the firm’s chances to 
survive  in  the  long  run.  The  literature  on  STC  is  relatively  scarce  in  France.  Recently, 
Calavrezo (2009) presented a complete description of the functionality of STC between 1995 
and 2005 in France. In the same vein, empirical studies concerning the effect of public policy 
devices  on  establishment  exit  or  establishment  survival  are  especially  less  developed,  as 
related data is missing. Our description of the review of the literature is two-fold: on the one 
hand,  we  briefly  describe  analyses  on  the  efficiency  of  STC  in  terms  of  employment 
protection  (Section  3.1);  on  the  other  hand,  we  present  some  papers  that  underscore  the 
relationship between public policy devices and establishment survival (Section 3.2).
3.1 STC efficiency in terms of employment protection
The  international  literature is  both theoretically  and empirically focused  on STC’s 
employment protection role (Wright, 1991; Abowd and Allain, 1997; Burdett and Wright, 
1989; Needels et al., 1997; Gray, 1998). Indeed, most of these papers study the effect of STC 
on redundancies. They show that STC’s effect is not identical among countries and even 
within the same country. In France, the few theoretical and/or empirical papers emphasize 
contrasting results  with respect to the functions of the data, the period of analysis or the 
methods used. Abraham and Houseman (1994) and Gray (1998) show a “positive” effect of 
STC on redundancies. On the other hand, Calavrezo et al. (2009a) analyze the relationship 
between STC authorizations and redundancies for establishments with at least 50 employees 
during the period 1996-2004. They show that establishments that use STC more intensively 
lay off more employees. There are several ways to interpret this finding. The authors suppose 10
that  the  resort  to  STC  authorizations  would  be  the  ultimate  (inefficient)  solution  before 
layoffs. From this point of view, STC authorizations and redundancies might complement 
each other in the face of economic difficulties. Another possible interpretation is that the STC 
program is a policy used to accompany establishments in structural decline (even if this is 
normally forbidden by law). These authors also consider that establishments would resort to 
STC  to  calm  social  tensions  before  a  planned  redundancy  scheme,  or  to  reassure  the 
shareholders, as using STC might represent a sort of a guarantee from the State. Whatever the 
true  interpretation,  the  STC  program  does  not  fulfill  its  role  of  protecting  French 
establishments  (with  at  least  50  employees)  that  face  strong  economic  difficulties  from 
redundancies.  Nevertheless,  this  result  cannot  be  interpreted  as  a  signal  of  complete 
inefficiency of STC in terms of employment protection. Additional analysis is needed. For 
this reason, our paper studies the relationship between the use of STC and establishment exit. 
Even if STC does not protect all employees from redundancy, it can nevertheless assure the 
survival of the establishment and in this way, protect the remaining employees: in this case, 
establishment exit can be seen as an extreme case of redundancy. 
3.2 The effects of public policy devices on establishment exit
Since  the  1990’s,  the  economic  literature  on firm  survival  has  strongly  developed 
(especially with the emergence of data permitting a better understanding of firm survival) and 
a particular attention has been paid to new firms entering the market (especially small firms). 
Firm survival is the conceptual opposite of firm exit. In a literature review, Caves (1998) 
describes the main determinants of the probability of firm survival. Firm features, such as age, 
size,  and  innovation  (Dunne  et  al.,  1989;  Geroski,  1995;  Agarwal  and  Gort,  1999),  or 
entrepreneurial  characteristics,  such  as  sex,  age,  and  professional  trajectory  before  the 
creation of the firm, are the main determinants of firm survival. Papers analyzing the impact 11
of public policy devices on firm survival generally deal with newly created firms and focus 
inevitably on small firms. Moreover, some of the literature studies the effects of government 
support  for firm  creation,  especially  firm  creation  designed  for  unemployed  people  (for 
Germany, Pféiffer and Reize, 2000; for young entrepreneurs in Italy, Battistin et al., 2001). 
Gu et al. (2008) survey the main papers on public (and private) policy devices for small firms 
in the United States. Their analysis emphasizes the difficulty of measuring the impact of 
financial support on different firm performance indicators. This is due to the existence of very 
limited data and very simple techniques used in previous studies. Gu et al. (2008) encourage 
the use of experimental and quasi-experimental methods. 
Our  approach  is  slightly  different.  Generally,  the  literature  analyzes  the  effect  of 
public policy devices for encouraging firm creation and assuring newly created firm survival. 
In our case, we use establishments of all ages (newly created or old establishments) in an a 
priori economic downturn. We control exclusively for establishment and firm characteristics. 
Our data sources allow for a good identification of firm exit. Nevertheless, our analysis is 
close to the literature in terms of the methodology used. We use propensity score matching 
techniques, which are mostly recommended for this type of analysis. 
4 Data
To assess the impact of participation in the STC French program on establishment exit 
between 2000 and 2005, we use six different data sources. We construct for each year a 
different  file.  Finally,  we  work  with  six  different  files,  according  to  the  year.  Some 
administrative data sets contain supplementary information on establishments or on firms to 
which establishments belong. 
First,  we  use  monthly  STC  authorization  databases. They  are  produced  by  the 
Departmental Directions of Work and Employment and by the Statistical Department of the 12
French Labor Ministry. When facing a strong economic downturn, an employer can request a 
specified number of STC days. If the request is justifiable, the Departmental Directions of 
Work and Employment provides an authorization for a specified number of STC days. The 
files we use give information about the STC authorizations obtained by French establishments 
between  1995  and  2005.  The  authorized  STC  imperfectly  measures  the  actual  STC 
compensation received by establishments, for which they receive financial compensation from 
the State. Indeed, some establishments can decide not to use STC authorized days. In the 
database, the number of compensated days is not available at establishment or firm level. 
Thus we measure the number of authorized STC days. It is the maximum number of days to 
be compensated and it represents an indicator of business expectations. We analyze the STC 
behavior  at  the  establishment  level  with  yearly  indicators.  From  these  databases,  we 
constituted an exhaustive STC panel. It covers more than 93,000 French establishments of all 
industries, which had at least one STC authorization between 1995 and 2005. Finally, we 
retain for our analysis only one measure of STC: for each establishment i and for each year t
we construct a dummy variable indicating the participation in the STC program (denoted 
STCit ). 
[Insert Table 1]
Second, we use the SIREN file, which is an administrative database produced by the 
French National Institute of Statistics indicating the status of French establishments in August 
2007 (establishments are either active or have disappeared); it also gives information on the 
date  of  creation  of  establishments.  This  file  permits  us  to  calculate  the  age  of  the 
establishment (a continuous variable denoted AGEit
4) and six exit  dummy indicators (see 
table 1). We use these establishment exit variables to control for potential lagged effects of 
                                                
4 This variable is calculated as the difference between the year of interest and the year of creation of the firm. We 
do not take into account the month of creation of the establishment. 13
STC recourse. With this data source, an establishment exit represents all types of suspension 
of  activity  in  French  territory:  establishment  shutdowns  (for  economic  reasons,  without 
appealing to the courts for bankruptcy; situations in which the establishment finds a buyer 
without appealing to the courts), establishment failure (with a court-mandated recourse) or 
other situations in which the establishment is involved in a process of merger and acquisition 
(M&A).  Nevertheless,  the  situation  of  M&A  does  not  correspond  exactly  to  the  actual 
disappearance of an establishment and we must take into account this aspect when merging 
data sets. For each year, we construct four classes of establishment age, each corresponding to 
a quartile of the establishment age distribution. Finally, in our regressions we introduce only 
the dummy variable corresponding to the oldest establishments (the dummy variable for the 
fourth quartile of the establishment age distribution). 
Third,  we  use  annual  administrative  data  sources  relating  to  the  establishments’ 
unemployment  insurance systems and covering the 1995-2003  period: the  UNEDIC files. 
These give information about the size of the establishment  SIZEit (a continuous variable that 
indicates  the  number  of  employees  in  the  establishment);  the  establishment’s  industry 
INDUSTRYit (which  is  captured  by  14  dummy  variables  corresponding  to  the  main  14 
aggregated French industries, excepting agriculture and the public sector administration); and 
the number of women in the establishment (WOMENit ). For the  WOMENit variable, we 
calculate the percentage of women in the establishment and we introduce the quartiles of this 
ratio in our estimations by taking as a reference the first quartile. For industry dummies, the 
industry’s “education, health and social action” is our reference in the econometric model. 
Fourth, additional information is obtained from the databases of the firms to which 
establishments belong (the FICUS files). They cover the period 1994-2005. We retain the 
following  two firm  indicators:  the firm  size  ( it SIZE FIRM _ )  and  the firm’s  value added 14
( it VA ).  We  calculate  two  indicators  of  the  economic  health  of  the  firm  to  which  the 
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 ).  For  the  variable  VA VAR_ ,  we 
calculate its values at time t and its values lagged by one year (t-1). For the  LP variable, we 
only  calculate  its  values  at  time  t. Since  1998,  the  FICUS  files  have  contained  more 
information: the legal status of the firm (we construct a legal status variable  it LS , which 
equals 1 if the firm to which the establishment belongs is a for-profit firm and 0 otherwise), a 
variable indicating whether or not a firm was restructured (dummy variable - RESTRUCTit )
and  a  variable  indicating  whether  or  not  the  establishment  belongs  to  a  financial  group 
(dummy  variable  - GROUP it ).  Finally,  the  GROUP variable  will not  be retained  in  our 
estimation, as it does not have any impact on the propensity to take STC recourse. For the 
RESTRUCTit variable, we also calculate its values lagged by one year and by two years (t-1 
and t-2). 
Fifth,  some  additional  information  is  obtained  from  the  DADS  files  (2002-2005), 
which are administrative files containing data at the establishment level. We mainly collect 
information about employee skill sets:  NOSKILLit gives the number of employees having no 
skills and HIGHSKILLit gives the number of highly skilled employees. We then calculate the 
percentages of unskilled and highly skilled employees and dummy variables corresponding to 
the quartiles of their distributions. Finally, we use only the first quartile from the share of 
unskilled employees and the fourth quartile from the share of highly skilled employees. As 
UNEDIC files end in 2003, the variables SIZEit ,  INDUSTRYit and  WOMENit are taken 
from  the  2004-2005  DADS  files.  To  control  for  the  geographical  location  of  the 15
establishment, we introduce dummies corresponding to the eight principal French regions, 
according to a definition from the National French Institute of Statistics (INSEE):  k REGit
where k=1,...,8.
Finally, we use the CITRUS database. It is produced by the National French Institute 
of  Statistics  and  it  contains  firm  data.  CITRUS  is  a  quasi-exhaustive  dataset  for  listed 
companies  and  their  subsidiary  companies  that  have  to  release  notifications  of  mergers, 
scissions and summons. Since its creation in 1998, the CITRUS file has been improved by 
integrating new sources of information. Nonetheless, the increase in information from the 
most recent period must be handled with caution. In CITRUS, the period 2000-2005 seems 
relatively homogenous in terms of the quality of data and firm coverage. We use this data 
source to control for the fact that establishment exits (identified with the SIREN file) are not 
due to M&As for the period 2000-2005. In other words, for each year of the period 2000-
2005, we check that firms to which establishments belong that disappear in t, t+1 or t+2
according to the SIREN file are not associated with M&As
5. For each M&A in the CITRUS 
file, we can identify the merging company and the “absorbed company”. We eliminate from 
our data set firms that appear as “absorbed firms” in the previous year or the year of interest 
(t) and disappear in t, t+1 or t+2. For example, for 2002, we eliminate establishments that, 
according to the SIREN file, exited in 2002, 2003 or 2004 and that belonged to firms that, 
according to the CITRUS source, were “absorbed” by other firms in 2002. We do not impose 
any control  on  the  type of  M&A.  As  we  concentrate  on exit  phenomena, establishments 
belonging to merging companies on the period of analysis are not eliminated. The use of the 
CITRUS  data  source  means  that  for  each  year  we  eliminate  approximately  20,000 
establishments. We have to recall that the main bias introduced by this type of check is the 
difference between firm and establishment data: our data are at the establishment level and we 
                                                
5 CITRUS gives information through 2006. For the year 2005, we cannot control for potential M&As in 2007.16
eliminate  establishments whose  parent  firms  are  in  the  process  of  an  M&A.  Even  if  the 
quality  of  the  information  from  the  SIREN  file  is  sufficiently  good  to  identify  an 
establishment’s  exit,  this  type  of  check  is  nevertheless  necessary.  Henceforward,  an 
establishment  exit  means  all  types  of  activity  suspension  in  French  territory,  excepting 
situations of M&As (more precisely, excepting situations of “absorbed firms” in M&As).
[Insert Figure 1]
To obtain the yearly final  samples, we imposed three  stages in the data cleansing 
process.  The  first  stage  consists  of  erasing  establishments  that  are  supposedly  inactive, 
establishments that disappear before the year of interest or are created after the year of interest 
(for  example,  for  the  year  2002,  we  erased  establishments  that  “die”  before  2002  or  are 
created  after  2002).  In  the  second  stage,  we  eliminated  establishments  and  firms  with  0 
employees in order not to have incoherent values in terms of STC use. Finally, we erased all 
observations with missing values for our control variables
6. For the period 1995-1999, the 
number of establishments that exited in t, t+1 or t+2 is curiously small. This might be the 
consequence of the quality of data collection in the SIREN file, which seems of a better 
quality since 2000. For this reason, we decided to restrain our period of analysis to 2000-
2005.
Merging these six data sources allows us to use a very rich and original data set to 
study the relationship between STC and establishment exit. By merging the six databases and 
by imposing these data cleansing checks, we obtain a data set for each year that contains more 
than 550,000 observations
7. Our purpose is to analyze the effects of STC on establishment 
exit varying in time (in t, t+1, t+2). For example, for 2002, we study how the recourse to STC 
                                                
6 For continuous variables, we analyze their distributions and aberrant values. As the number of aberrant values 
was very small each time, we decided to work with deciles and quartiles, respectively, and in this way, avoid the 
influence of these aberrant values without excluding the establishments from the analysis. 
7 As we study the effect of STC on establishment exit, it is not possible to construct a panel of establishments. 
Each year, the final sample contains a different number of establishments. 17
in  2002  affects  establishment  exit  in  2002,  2003  and  2004  (as  well  as  associated  cross-
effects). To analyze the effect of STC in 2002 on the establishment exit in 2003 or 2004, we 
must  eliminate establishments  that  exit  in  2002.  If  we  do  not  eliminate  them,  we  will 
introduce a bias, as these establishments are already “dead”. For this reason, we assess each 
year with three different sample size files. The first file corresponds to the file obtained after 
merging the six data sets (sample 1). With this file, we analyze the effect of STC in t on the 
exit indicators E0, E01 and E012. The second file is obtained by eliminating establishments 
that disappear in t (sample 2). In this situation, we analyze the effect of STC in t on the exit 
indicators E1 and E12. Finally, we eliminate establishments that disappear in t+1 and we 
obtain the last file (sample 3), which is used for analyzing the impact of STC in t on the E2
indicator. 
The recourse to STC stands for a “rare phenomenon.” Between 1995 and 2005, we 
estimated  that,  on  average,  STC  concerns  less  than  1%  of  the  establishments  from  all 
industries, excepting agriculture (Calavrezo et al, 2009b). Besides, between 1995 and 2005, 
the  number  of  establishments  that  had  STC  authorizations  significantly  decreased  in 
metropolitan France (see figure 1). Between 1996 and 2005, the number of establishments 
with STC authorizations diminished from 34,000 establishments to 5,000 (a fall of 85%). For 
example, in 2002, approximately 7,000 establishments had STC authorizations. In our final 
sample for the year 2002, among our 650,000 establishments after several matching steps we 
identify  around  3,600  establishments  with  STC  authorizations.  For  this  reason,  we  must 
implement an econometric strategy that takes into account the under-representation of STC 
recourse. 
5 The econometric strategy18
In this study, we seek to evaluate the effect of the STC recourse on establishment exit. 
The interest in such an analysis is very high, as Calavrezo et al. (2009a) show that STC seems 
to be only “postponing” redundancies. Several factors are likely to explain establishment exit, 
and  maybe  to  simultaneously  affect  establishment  exit  and  STC  recourse,  producing  a 
selection bias. At the heart of our statistical evaluation, we must deal with the problem of 
selection  bias.  In  our  case,  having STC  authorizations  is a  decision  that  is  based  on  the 
entrepreneur’s choice being at least partly rational. This decision cannot be independent from 
the way the entrepreneur evaluates the consequences of his choice. Establishments having 
STC  authorizations  are  subject  to  a  non-random  selection  process  (according  to  their 
economic performance, short-term downturns, and structural downturns, among others), or 
even an auto-selection process, if we consider that the recourse to STC is an element of their 
internal strategies. Not taking into account this factor can lead to biased results. On the other 
hand,  having  an  STC  authorization  also  contains  a  random  component,  as  being  STC-
authorized depends on the department (the French county) where the entrepreneur requests 
authorizations from the administration (this aspect will be explained more precisely in section 
6.4.3). 
In order to analyze the effect of  STC on establishment exit by controlling for the 
selection  bias  related  to  the  STC  recourse,  we  use  propensity  score  models.  These  were 
initially  developed  by  Rosenbaum  and  Rubin  (1983)  to  study  the  efficiency  of  medical 
treatments. Since then, these models have been improved (see for example Heckman and his 
various  co-authors)  and  used  in  economics  especially  to  test  the  efficiency  of  training 
programs  (for  a  complete  survey  see  Heckman,  Smith  and  Lalonde,  1999).  This  method 
consists of comparing the “health” of each establishment that receives the treatment (uses 
STC) with the “health” of an identical counterfactual that does not receive the treatment (does 
not use STC). To identify statistically the counterfactual, the approach consists of building a 19
counterfactual  population  for  which  the  distribution  of  the  propensity  score,  calculated 
according to a number of observable characteristics, is the same as for the group receiving the 
treatment . By comparing the exit rate of establishments using STC and of counterfactuals, we 
can determine the impact of STC on establishment exit. 
Our annual files permit us to identify two types of establishments: establishments that 
take recourse in t to STC ( 1  STC ) and those that do not use STC in t ( 0  STC ). The 
efficiency of the treatment is measured through the result i y . Thus each establishment has two 
potential results:  0 y (if STC = 0) and  1 y (if STC = 1). The effect of the recourse to STC on 
establishment  exit  (C  =  y1  - y0)  is  unobservable  and  individual  (and  consequently  its 
distribution is not identifiable), as 0 y and  1 y are never observed simultaneously (because an 
individual is either treated or untreated, but never both at the same time). Only the “true” 
result  (translated  by  the  establishment  exit  and  denoted  Y)  is  observed: 
) 1 ( 0 1 STC y STC y Y    .
i Y is the vector of performance variables:  ) (
j
i i E Y  . The variable E indicates if the 
establishments disappear (if they are “dead”) after STC use. The index j = 0, 1, 2, 01, 12, 012
indicates the temporal window in which we calculate the effect (see Table 1 for more details). 
Performance variables are calculated for the six years of analysis (t = 2000,…2005). Only the 
couple (Y, STC) is observed for each establishment. However, if performance variables are 
independent  of  the  assignment  to  the  treatment, STC y y  ) , ( 1 0 .  In  other  words,  if  the 
assignment to the treatment is random, then the average effect on the treated can be identified 
as  ) 1 ( 0 1    STC y y E Ctreated .  In  the  majority  of  cases,  the  property  of  independence  is 
invalid.  A  solution would  be  to  compare  the  health  of  each  individual  who  received  the 
treatment with the health of an identical counterfactual who did not receive the treatment. To 
statistically  identify the  counterfactual,  the approach  consists  of  building  a  counterfactual 20
population for which the distribution of a number of observable characteristics (X – matching 
variables) is the same as for the group receiving the treatment. In this way we can reduce the 
selection bias. Consequently, the property of independence must be respected conditional to 
matching criteria and is less restrictive:
X STC y y  ) , ( 1 0                                                            (1)
From  the  literature  on  STC  and  establishment  exit,  we  retain  three  categories  of 
control  variables.  First,  we  use  “standard”  establishment  characteristics  (size,  industry, 
geographical location, age) and firm characteristics (legal status, restructuring). Second, we 
control for economic performance variables: the value-added variation rate in t and lagged by 
one year
8 and apparent labor productivity lagged by one year. Finally, we use variables that 
describe  the  structure  of  the  labor  force  inside  the  establishment:  the  share  of  unskilled 
workers and the share of highly skilled workers, as well as the share of women. 
When  many  matching  criteria  are  taken  into  account  (as  in  our  case),  finding  a 
counterfactual  can  be  problematic.  Rubin  and Rosenbaum  (1983)  solved  this  problem  by 
showing that conditional independence with the X variables was equivalent to independence 
compared to the propensity score,  ) (X P :
) ( ) , ( 1 0 X P STC y y                                                             (2)
The  propensity  score  constitutes  a  one-dimensional  summary  of  the  matching 
variables and estimates the probability of being exposed to the treatment, conditional on these 
variables. 
Propensity score matching models are two-step methods. In the first step, we have to 
estimate the propensity score. In our case, we estimate it with a logit model and we use two 
different specifications (depending on the variables that are available for each year). The first 
model (Model A) is estimated for all the years of the period 2000-2005 and contains the 
                                                
8 For example, in 1998, we use the value-added variation rate calculated for 1997 (the evolution between 1996 
and 1997). 21
following  explanatory  variables:  size,  age,  industry,  department,  percentage  of  women, 
apparent labor productivity, value-added variation rate,  legal status and restructuring. The 
second model (Model B) is estimated for the period 2002-2005 and contains the following 
additional  explanatory  variables:  percentage  of  unskilled  workers  and  of  highly  skilled 
workers.
In  the  second  step,  depending  on  the  propensity  scores  of  treated  and  untreated 
establishments,  there  are  several  matching  techniques:  kernel  matching,  nearest-neighbor 
matching, radius matching and stratification matching (see Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008 for a 
complete presentation of these different estimators). In our data, the number of establishments 
that do not use STC is very high (the control group). For example, for the year 2002, the final 
sample contains 650,000 establishments and approximately 3,600 establishments participate 
in the STC program. Thus it seems appropriate that we perform matching using the nearest-
neighbor  method.  This  estimation  is  the  most  simple  among  propensity  score  matching 
methods, as it consists of choosing for each treated establishment the counterfactual that is the 
nearest in terms of the propensity score value. There are several peformance types for this 
method.  First,  nearest-neighbor  matching  can  be  performed  with  replacement  or  without 
replacement.  In  the first  case,  an  untreated  establishment  can  be used  several  times as a 
counterfactual.  In  the  second  case,  an  establishment  can  only  be  used  once  for  the 
construction  of  the  counterfactual
9.  There  is  a  trade-off  between  bias  and  variance:  if 
replacement of establishments is permitted, the average quality of the matching will increase 
and the bias will decrease. Then, we can use more than one establishment to construct the 
counterfactual (the case of “oversampling”). In this case, there is also a trade-off between bias 
and  variance:  the  variance  decreases  (as  we  use  more  information  to  construct 
counterfactuals)  and  the  bias  increases,  being  the  result  of  average  matching  of  inferior 
                                                
9 In the case of nearest-neighbor matching without replacement, the estimation depends on the order in which 
establishments are matched. Establishments should be first randomly sorted. 22
quality (Smith, 1997). In the case of “oversampling,” one should establish first the number of 
partners to perform the matching and the weight affected to these partners. The method of 
nearest-neighbor can lead to bad quality matching if the nearest neighbor is far in terms of its 
propensity  score  value.  As  only  0.5%  of  the  establishments  of  our  sample  receive  the 
treatment, this indicates that the probability of finding a unique establishment without the 
treatment and with an almost identical propensity score is very high. Finally, we decide to 
implement nearest-neighbor matching without “oversampling” (called one-to-one matching) 
with replacement by restricting a maximum distance between propensity scores for the treated 
and their nearest neighbors (generally referred to in the economic literature as caliper) to 
0.0001
10. We also impose the common support condition. Standard errors are calculated with 
the  analytical  expression  of  the  variance  of  the  nearest-neighbor  estimator.  Abadie  and 
Imbens (2006) show that calculating standard errors with bootstrap techniques cannot be done 
for the nearest-neighbor estimator. A common problem in evaluation papers is that the sample 
used is particular (Smith and Todd, 2005). For example, participants in the program are over-
represented  in  comparison  to  the  number  of  admissible  people.  This  problem  is  called 
“choice-based sampling” and exists in this case. In our files, the number of STC beneficiaries 
is very weak (less than 1%). Heckman and Smith (1995) showed that to solve this problem, 
matching must be done on the odd-ratios. They also show that for matching with a unique 
nearest neighbor, matching on the propensity score or on the odd-ratios gives the same results. 
We also implement some tests that verify the quality of the matching. 
To conclude, for each establishment exit variable, and for each of the two possible 
model  specifications,  we  implement  nearest-neighbor  matching.  For  each  sample  during 
                                                
10 We tested several values for the caliper, but we finally choose the value 0.0001 because the values for the 
propensity score are very small in our case. Because of a large number of zeros associated with the recourse to 
STC and  at  the  same  time  related to  the  fact  that  we  control  with  categorical  variables,  the  values  of  the 
propensity score are concentrated around 0. 23
period 2000-2001, we apply one matching technique and for each sample during the period 
2002-2005 we apply two matching techniques. 
6 The results
We first present some descriptive statistics based on our final samples (section 6.1). 
We  then  outline  the  determinants  of  the  probability  to  benefit  from  STC  authorizations 
(section 6.2). Section 6.3 presents the results of the econometric strategy. Section 6.4 presents 
the results for establishments with at least 50 employees. Finally, we test the robustness of the 
relationship between STC and establishment exit variables by using alternative samples and 
methods (section 6.5).
6.1 Descriptive statistics
In Table 2, we present the different files we used for each year and for the three 
samples.  We  provide  a  “global  picture”  of  STC  recourse  and  establishment  exit 
(establishment exit variables are presented in more detail in Table 1). Each year the files 
include  around  650,000  establishments.  Among  them,  approximately  3,500  use  STC 
authorizations (0.6%) and 10-12% exit in t, t+1 or t+2 (E012 dummy variable). For example, 
in 2002, approximately 6% of establishments exited by 2003 (E01 dummy variable). This 
statistic is consistent with figures given generally in the literature: firms’ average annual exit 
rate is between 5% and 10% (see Agarwal and Gort, 1999; Dunne et al., 1988, Baldwin and 
Gorecki, 1991). 
[Insert Table 2]
6.2 The determinants of STC recourse24
In the first stage of the econometric strategy, we estimate the probability of using STC 
authorizations in a given year with a logit model. For 2000 and 2001, we only use Model A. 
For the period 2002-2005, we use the two specifications: Model A and Model B (see section 5 
for more details). Table 3 presents the results of the logit model only for the year 2002 (we 
retain only sample 1 and present the results for Model A and Model B)
11. We find the same 
results for all the years of the study.
[Insert Table 3]
We analyze the correlation between the probability of using STC and establishments’ 
and  firms’  characteristics.  We  use  four  “standard”  variables:  size,  industry,  age  and 
geographic location.
We find quite “traditional” results in terms of STC use: the probability of benefitting 
from  STC  authorizations  increases  with  the  establishment’s  size  (Gray,  1998).  Industry 
dummies are strongly significant due to the sectoral dimension of STC use. Establishments 
from  the  following  industries  have  a  higher  probability  of  benefitting  from  STC 
authorizations in comparison to the industry “education, health and social action” (which is 
the reference): manufacture of consumer goods, manufacture of motor vehicles, manufacture 
of  capital  equipment,  manufacture  of  intermediate  goods  and  the  transportation  industry. 
Regional dummies are always significant.  This shows the importance of  the geographical 
location  for  STC  recourse.  Being  outside  the  Paris  region  (the  “Ile-de-France”  region) 
increases the probability of using STC in 2002. Finally, older establishments (belonging to the 
fourth quartile of establishment age distribution) have a higher probability of using STC, 
probably because of a better knowledge of the device. 
                                                
11 In Appendix 1, we present the distribution of establishments’ and firms’ characteristics according to their use 
of STC for the year 2002 (sample 1 and Model B).25
We  also  introduce  “standard”  firm-level  variables:  the  firm’s  legal  status and  a 
variable indicating whether or not a firm has been restructured. The fact that an establishment 
belongs to a for-profit firm is positively and significantly associated with the probability of 
benefitting from STC authorizations. The restructuring plans that we measure here do not 
involve the exit of the firm; in other words, they do not concern “absorbed companies” from 
M&As (see section 4). Being restructured in 2002 decreases the probability of using STC 
during  the  year.  However,  being a  restructured  firm  in  2001  increases  the  probability  of 
benefitting from STC authorizations. This might be due to the fact that a restructuring in t-1 
would  involve  a  “negative”  shock  on  the  economic  performance  of  the  firm,  involving 
additional requests for STC authorizations.
The economic performance of the establishment’s parent firm plays a substantial role 
in STC use. To take into account the economic situation of the firm, we introduce the value-
added  growth  rate  (in  2002  and  2001)  and  apparent  labor  productivity  (in  2001).  The 
introduction of these variables is absolutely necessary because STC use and establishment’s 
exit depend strongly on the economic situation. Globally, the use of STC in t decreases with 
the level of apparent labor productivity in t-1.  Similarly,  the probability of STC  use in t
decreases with the value-added growth rate in t and t-1. This negative link between good 
economic performances and the use of STC authorizations was evidenced by Gray (1998) and 
by the papers of Calavrezo et al. (2009a and b) on STC in France. Moreover, according to the 
law, an establishment has to prove that it is in a bad economic situation in order to benefit 
from STC authorizations.
The last category of variables takes into account the structure of the labor force: the 
share of women, as well as the share of highly skilled and unskilled workers. We find the 
expected results: establishments that use the least STC authorizations are those with more 26
highly skilled workers. Moreover, the probability of STC use increases when the share of 
women is high.
To estimate correctly the effect of the use of STC on establishment exit, we must have 
a sufficiently large common support for propensity scores: the probability of establishments 
using  STC  and  the  probability  of  establishments  not  using  STC  have  to  overlap  at  a 
maximum. In our case, the distributions of propensity scores of treated and non-treated groups 
almost  completely  overlap.  We  check  if  the  two  models  that  explain  STC  use  are  well 
specified  by  implementing  a  test  that analyzes  standardized  differences.  This  test  was 
elaborated  by  Rosenbaum  and  Rubin  (1985).  It  computes  for  each  matching  variable  a 
measure of the diminution of the selection bias. It is easy to implement. It is equivalent to a 
test of equality of means of treated and non-treated groups, before and after matching. We 
compute the reduction of the bias associated with the difference of average differences before 
and after matching. We present the test for 2002 (sample 1, Model B) in Appendix 2. Thus we 
observe strong bias reductions. We conclude that variables that we introduced in the logit 
model determine well the probability of using STC.
6.3 The effect of STC on establishment exit
In the second stage of the econometric strategy, we use propensity scores previously 
estimated with the logit model. For each treated establishment, by comparing its propensity 
score, we determine a counterfactual establishment that is not treated. Then, we estimate the 
average effect of the treatment on the difference of means of the “performance” variable for 
the treated establishments and their counterfactuals. We have six “performance” variables 
(establishment exit variables). We only present the average effects of the treatment (STC use) 
on the treated establishments (the ATT effect).27
For each year and each model (Models A and B), we implement a nearest-neighbor 
propensity  score  matching  with  replacement,  by  imposing  the  condition  that  the  nearest 
neighbor has a propensity score in a radius inferior to 0.0001. 
Regardless of what the model considers, the significance is the same with slightly 
different effects (Table 4). The principal result suggests that the STC does not prevent an 
establishment from exiting the following year (measured with the dummy variable E1): there 
is a significant and positive effect. For Model A, this effect takes values comprised between 
0.4 and 3.6 points, according to the year of interest. For Model B, the effect varies between 
1.4 and 3.3 points. For example, using Model B for 2002, the use of STC increases by 3.3 
points the probability for an establishment to exit in 2003. 
[Insert Table 4]
With  regards  to  the  E0 dummy  (the  exit  of  the  establishment  during  the  year  of 
interest), STC use has no effect. This can be explained by the fact that for the current year, 
exit variables are not as well-observed, probably because of registration deadlines for the exit. 
In other words, it is difficult to observe establishment exits in the current year. 
Regarding the  exit of  the establishment two years later  (E2), the effects are more 
"mixed": most of the time they are positive and sometimes they are equal to zero. When 
significant, these effects are less strong (than for E1) and at maximum they equal  to 2.2 
points. How can we explain this result? A priori, we expect that STC use has no effect two 
years later, as STC is a short-term device. Thus, firstly, the effects found on E2 can perhaps 
be  explained  by  registration  deadlines.  Moreover,  these  positive  effects  include 
establishments of different sizes that do not disappear at the same pace. Large establishments 
take longer to disappear because of constraints on collective redundancies (see section 6.4).28
As  the  temporality  of  the  relationship  between  STC  and  establishment  exit  is  not 
easily grasped, cross-variables of exit (E01, E12 and E012) can provide a temporal margin to 
interpret  the  results.  Our  results  show  that  the  use  of  STC  significantly  increases  the 
probability of an establishment exit. Excepting E2, the effects are larger when the “temporal 
dimension” is wider.
6.4 Test on a subsample of establishments with at least 50 employees
In this section, we want to test whether or not the demography of large establishments 
is the same as the demography of establishments of all sizes with regard to STC recourse. In 
addition, Calavrezo et al. (2009a) analyze the relationship between STC and redundancies in 
establishments with at least 50 employees. They find that establishments that use STC more 
intensively  also  have  a  larger  number  of  redundancies.  We  focus  on  this  population  of 
establishments in order to more easily compare our results to the study of Calavrezo et al. 
(2009a).  We  present  the  results  in  Table  6  only  for  the  year  2002.  Several  changes  are 
necessary to implement this test.
[Insert Table 5]
When we focus on establishments with at least 50 employees, some industries do not 
use STC authorizations in 2002: energy, financial intermediation, real estate activities and the 
industry  of  education,  health  and  social  action
12.  We  exclude  these  industries  from  the 
analysis. For this new population, we recalculate the quartiles for the following variables: the 
value-added variation rate (in 2001 and 2002), the labor productivity (in 2001 and 2002), the 
age of the establishment (its quartiles), the share of women and share of unskilled and highly 
skilled (their quartiles) workers. We work with quartiles rather than deciles, as the sample of 
                                                
12 In this industry, only one establishment with at least 50 employees has STC authorizations in 2002.  29
establishments  with  at  least  50  employees  is  much  smaller  (approximately  20,000 
establishments, where only 500 are concerned with STC authorizations).
The main result of this robustness test shows no effect of STC on the E1 dummy 
variable but, in contrast, shows the existence of a significant positive effect on E2 (the exit of 
the  establishment  in  t+2).  If  we  use  the  second  model  specification  (Model  B)  and  the 
estimator with replacement, where the nearest neighbor is within a radius less than 0.0001, the 
effect of STC is much higher for the subsample of establishments with at least 50 employees 
(see Tables 5 and 6): on average, the exit of establishments with at least 50 employees using 
STC is higher by 4.8 points (it is 1.7 points for the initial sample).
For establishments with at least 50 employees, the relationship between STC use and 
the exit of establishments seems to be delayed. Behind this result lie two related aspects: an 
economic aspect (demography of large establishments is not the same) and a statistical aspect 
(on  this  subsample,  there  are  fewer  exits  of  establishments).  Large  firms  have  more 
substantial legal constraints. For example, a firm with at least 50 employees is obliged to 
implement a safeguard plan for employment if the employer wishes to dismiss at least 10 
employees over a period of 30 days. Such procedures are probably more costly in terms of 
time when the size of the establishment is large. In addition, large firms are also involved in 
the development of training plans with employees, which can lengthen the time between STC 
use and their exit.
6.5 Robustness tests 
To validate the robustness of our results, we do some checks by mobilizing additional 
samples and alternative methods. 
6.5.1. Tests with other nearest-neighbor estimators30
We implement three additional nearest-neighbor estimations in order to test whether or 
not the results change with replacement, without replacement, and without replacement by 
imposing that the nearest neighbor has the propensity score in a radius inferior to 0.0001. 
Table 6 presents the results for this test, only for 2002 (a randomly chosen year). 
[Insert Table 6]
For all the variants of the match, we always find the same significance with quite 
similar effects (see Table 6). For example, for the E012 dummy variable, the effect varies 
from 4.7 points for the fourth variant to 5.3 points for the first variant of the match. For the 
variable E1, which concerns us particularly, the effects are almost identical and equal to 3.6 
points for all four of the variants.
6.5.2. Tests on subsamples constructed from French departments
To  take  into  account  the  heterogeneity  of  departmental  behavior in  terms  of  STC 
authorizations, we implement our econometric strategy on subsamples of establishments. 
The methodology of propensity score matching allows us to measure the effect of STC 
use on establishment exit. If these effects are not biased, then STC use conditional on the 
retained  observable  characteristics  must  be  independent  of  the  exit  of  establishments. 
However, it is likely that unobservable characteristics influence STC use, as well as the exit of 
establishments. For this reason, even when conditioned on observable characteristics, there is 
always a suspicion that STC use is not independent of establishment exit. In section 5, we 
explain that considering the nature of the observed phenomena (STC use and establishment 
exit), it is not possible to develop models that control unobservable characteristics, such as the 31
DID models with propensity score matching or regression models with endogenous regimes
13. 
In this  section, and in  the next one, we  set  up tests  to remove this uncertainty.  Our test 
consists of implementing the initial econometric strategy on a subsample of establishments 
belonging to departments where STC use is more frequently authorized, and on a subsample 
of establishments belonging to departments where STC is less frequently authorized. A priori, 
given the econometric strategy and given the chosen observable characteristics, if we did not 
make STC use independent of establishment exit, we would get different effects for the two 
subsamples. However, if outcomes are significantly different from zero and positive for both 
subsamples, it will be a sign of a good control of the selection bias associated with STC use. 
Therefore, we will confirm that the estimated effects of our main econometric strategy are not 
biased. 
An employer who wishes to use STC must necessarily make a preliminary request to 
the French administration at the departmental level before the implementation of STC. The 
authorization has a geographic dimension (French departments correspond to US counties). In 
this paper, we use information on what is authorized by the French administration. Calavrezo 
(2009) shows that within French departments, beyond a “standard” application processing 
system to authorize STC (analysis of order books, visits to the firm, discussions with staff 
representatives, and verification of prior STC requests, among others), there is a subjective 
approach to authorizing STC that is specific to each departmental unit. We can imagine that 
the  way  STC  is  authorized  may  differ  at  the  departmental  level, beyond, of  course,  the 
industrial structure of the departments. For this reason, we want to test whether or not our 
results will change if we focus on different categories of establishments, built in terms of 
departmental  STC  authorizations.  We  perform  this  test  only  for  the  year  2002  using  the 
                                                
13 This  kind  of  model  is  alternately  called  a  switching  regression  model  with  endogenous  switching,  a 
mover/stayer model, a Roy model or Tobit V. A first treatment of heterogeneous subsamples is due to Roy 
(1951). 32
second model specification (Model B). To simplify the presentation of the results, we decide 
to present only the average effects calculated on sample 2 for the E1 dummy variable and for 
the E12 dummy variable (establishment exit one or two years later). Because in 2002, STC 
cannot be authorized by two French departments, we dismiss them from the analysis. We 
conduct a two-stage approach.
(i) We are interested in how STC is authorized at the level of the department. Initially, 
we  classify  departments  into  two  categories  relative  to  the  median  of  the  proportion  of 
establishments receiving STC authorizations in the department
14: departments where STC is 
authorized  more  intensely,  i.e.,  at  levels  exceeding  the  median  (category  STC  plus)  and 
departments where STC is authorized less intensively, that is to say, in proportions equal to or 
below the median (category STC minus). 
For each category of departments (categories STC plus and minus), we set up our 
econometric strategy with the same control variables as described in section 5. The results for 
establishments  belonging  to  the  category  STC  plus and  to  the  category  STC  minus  are 
presented in Table 7.
[Insert Table 7]
For the E1 variable, we find in both cases a significant positive effect of STC on the 
establishment exit in 2003. In the subsample of establishments with a more intensive STC use 
(STC plus), the average effect is 3.5 points. On the subsample STC minus, this average effect 
is slightly stronger: it takes values between 3.6 and 3.9 points. What conclusions can we draw 
from this test? Even while working on subsamples of establishments located in departments 
with different STC authorization behaviors, our results remain stable. This test is a check on 
our ability to correctly control for selection bias associated with STC authorizations.
                                                
14 This indicator is constructed according to establishments that are in our final annual samples and not according 
to what happens in an exhaustive way in the French economy.33
(ii) In a second step, we construct two other categories of establishments according to 
the intensity at which STC authorizations are given by the French departments between 2000 
and 2005. We construct a new variable STC_plus, which equals 1 if for each year of the 
period 2000-2005, the department authorizes STC in larger proportions than the median share 
of authorizations (category STC plus 2000-2005) and the opposite variable STC_minus, which 
equals 1 if for each year during the period 2000-2005, the department authorizes STC at 
levels  lower  than  the  median  share  of  authorizations
15.  We  introduce  the  same  control 
variables as compared to the previous case
16. The results for establishments in the categories 
STC plus 2000-2005 and STC minus 2000-2005 are presented in Table 8. 
We find the same results as in the previous robustness test: there is always a positive 
and significant effect. The effects are somewhat larger for the subsample of establishments 
STC  minus  2000-2005 (between  3.8  and  4.7  points)  than  for  establishments  from  the 
subsample STC plus 2000-2005 (between 3.1 and 3.4 points). This new test confirms once 
again a good control of the selection bias associated with STC use.
[Insert Table 8]
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between STC and establishment exit over the 
period  2000-2005  in  France.  The  use  of  STC  is  not  randomly  distributed  among 
establishments. Moreover, a particularly bad economic situation plays a crucial role in the 
decision to use STC and also in the exit of establishments. We propose a method of matching 
                                                
15 The construction  of these two variables is  made according to establishments that are in  our final annual 
samples and not according to what happens in an exhaustive way in the French economy.
16 However,  as  we  work with  fewer  departments  than  in  the previous  test,  some  regions  (among  the  eight 
aggregated regions) are excluded from the analysis.34
on the propensity score that takes into account several important economic health indicators 
(value-added variation rate and apparent labor productivity). We consider that, conditional on 
establishment and firm characteristics (chosen according to the economic literature), STC use 
is independent of establishment exit. Thus, the average effects of STC on establishment exit 
indicators are not a priori biased. 
Our  main  result  points  out  that,  considering  the  initial  samples,  having  STC 
authorizations in the current year impacts positively and significantly the probability for an 
establishment  to  exit  the  market  the  following  year.  We  also  show  the  absence  of  a 
simultaneous  relationship  between  STC  use  and  the  exit  of  establishments  (because  of 
registration deadlines). Our results also outline a smaller net effect of STC use on the exit of 
the establishment two years later. As the temporality of the relationship between STC and 
establishment exit is not obvious, we introduce "crossed" exit dummies (on temporal windows 
of different lengths) to give us more information. 
By focusing on large establishments (with at least 50 employees), we again find a time 
lag in the link between STC use and the exit of establishments: larger establishments have a 
different demography. 
As unobservable characteristics may affect STC use and the exit of establishments, 
even when controlling for a rich set of observables, there can be a suspicion that STC use is 
not independent of establishment exit. There can always be a doubt that establishments that 
use STC are also  those who inherently are less likely to survive. Tests of robustness are 
achieved on additional subsamples of establishments and with an alternative methodology to 
demonstrate  a  good  control  of  the  selection  bias.  On  the  one  hand,  we  implement 
supplementary nearest-neighbor estimators and we obtain the same results. On the other hand, 
we focus on subsamples of establishments with opposite behaviors in terms of STC at the 
departmental level. As we find the same effects for establishments belonging to departments 35
with intense STC authorizations and for establishments belonging to departments with weak 
STC authorizations, this confirms a good control of the selection bias. 
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it E Dummy variable which equals to 1 if the 
establishment exits in t and to 0 otherwise
1
it E Dummy variable which equals to 1 if the 
establishment exits in t+1 and to 0 otherwise
2
it E Dummy variable which equals to 1 if the 
establishment exits in t+2 and to 0 otherwise
01
it E Dummy variable which equals to 1 if the 
establishment exits in t or t+1 and to 0 
otherwise
12
it E Dummy variable which equals to 1 if the 
establishment exits in t+1 or t+2 and to 0 
otherwise
012
it E Dummy variable which equals to 1 if the 
establishment exits in t or t+1 or t+2 and to 0 
otherwise38










1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of establishments with STC authorizations
Source: Exhaustive panel of annual STC authorizations covering the period 1995 - 2005 (DARES, DDTEFP).
Field: French establishments with STC authorizations (all industries, all classes of establishment size).39
Table 2: Global statistics
Variable
2000 2001
Sample1 Sample2 Sample3 Sample1 Sample2 Sample3
% column STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1
E0=1 0.06 0.08 0.20 0.3
E01=1 0.47 0.79 4.51 7.17
E012=1 5.20 6.91 9.73 14.63
E1=1 0.41 0.71 4.32 6.96
E12=1 5.14 6.83 9.55 14.44
E2=1 4.75 6.16 5.47 8.04
Nb. est. E0=1 359 1,265
Nb. est. E01=1 2,676 28,872
Nb. est. E012=1 39,311 62,306
Nb. est. E1=1 2,317 27,607
Nb. est. E12=1 28,952 61,041
Nb. est. E2=1 26,635 33,434
Nb. est. STC=1 3,649 3,646 3,620 3,499 3,491 3,248
Observations 562,785 562,426 560,109 638,452 637,187 609,580
Variable
2000 2001
Sample1 Sample2 Sample3 Sample1 Sample2 Sample3
% column STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1
E0=1 0.98 1.15 1.10 1.44
E01=1 5.98 9.88 6.66 9.93
E012=1 11.75 17.54 12.53 17.26
E1=1 5.05 8.83 5.62 8.62
E12=1 10.87 16.58 11.56 16.05
E2=1 6.13 8.50 6.29 8.13
Nb. est. E0=1 6,476 7,710
Nb. est. E01=1 39,523 46,800
Nb. est. E012=1 77,591 88,003
Nb. est. E1=1 33,047 39,090
Nb. est. E12=1 71,115 80,293
Nb. est. E2=1 38,068 41,203
Nb. est. STC=1 3,643 3,601 3,283 3,755 3,701 3,382
Observations 658,793 652,317 619,270 701,032 693,322 654,232
Variable
2000 2001
Sample1 Sample2 Sample3 Sample1 Sample2 Sample3
% column STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1 STC=0 STC=1
E0=1 1.18 1.98 1.18 2.07
E01=1 6.84 11.10 6.33 9.97
E012=1 12.36 18.14 9.22 13.34
E1=1 5.73 9.31 5.21 8.07
E12=1 11.31 16.49 8.14 11.51
E2=1 5.92 7.92 3.09 3.74
Nb. est. E0=1 8,430 7,887
Nb. est. E01=1 48,902 42,437
Nb. est. E012=1 88,245 61,806
Nb. est. E1=1 40,472 34,550
Nb. est. E12=1 79,815 53,919
Nb. est. E2=1 39,343 19,369
Nb. est. STC=1 3,026 2,966 2,690 2,759 2,702 2,484
Observations 712,603 704,173 663,701 669,107 661,220 626,670
Source: Samples obtained by matching six data sets.
Field: Establishments from metropolitan France (all industries excepting agriculture and public sector). 40
Table 3: The determinants of the STC recourse (2002, sample 1)
Variable







Less than 20 employees Ref. Ref.
20-49 employees 0.5634 *** 0.0489 0.5146 *** 0.0501
50-499 employees 1.0128 *** 0.0538 0.9552 *** 0.0553
500 employees and more 1.2084 *** 0.2259 1.1516 *** 0.2265
For-profit firm 0.1495 *** 0.0506 0.1513 *** 0.0510
Restructuring in 2002 -0.7566 *** 0.2303 -0.7460 *** 0.2303
Restructuring in 2001 0.4049 *** 0.1354 0.4146 *** 0.1355
Establishment age
4th quartile 0.2133 *** 0.0369 0.2057 *** 0.0369
Geographic location
Ile-de-France  Ref. Ref.
Centre North 0.9896 *** 0.0728 0.9627 *** 0.0732
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 1.0476 *** 0.0898 1.0178 *** 0.0902
East 0.7620 *** 0.0836 0.7372 *** 0.0839
North West Atlantic 0.6969 *** 0.0808 0.6744 *** 0.0812
South West 0.6147 *** 0.0845 0.5925 *** 0.0848
Centre South 1.1340 *** 0.0729 1.1139 *** 0.0732
Midi Mediterranean 1.1785 *** 0.0774 1.1585 *** 0.0776
Value added variation rate in 2002
1
st decile Ref. Ref.
2
nd decile -0.5429 *** 0.0520 -0.5472 *** 0.0521
3
rd decile -0.9692 *** 0.0612 -0.9743 *** 0.0612
4
th decile -1.0273 *** 0.0609 -1.0319 *** 0.0609
5
th decile -1.1795 *** 0.0738 -1.1845 *** 0.0738
6
th decile -1.5971 *** 0.0802 -1.6016 *** 0.0802
7
th decile -1.6668 *** 0.0824 -1.6711 *** 0.0824
8
th decile -1.6942 *** 0.0831 -1.6980 *** 0.0831
9
th decile -1.7498 *** 0.0851 -1.7545 *** 0.0850
10
th decile -1.5411 *** 0.0777 -1.5390 *** 0.0777
Value added variation rate in 2001
1
st decile Ref. Ref.
2
nd decile -0.1224 ** 0.0651 -0.1306 ** 0.0651
3
rd decile -0.2016 *** 0.0688 -0.2112 *** 0.0688
4
th decile -0.2372 *** 0.0712 -0.2477 *** 0.0712
5
th decile -0.3449 *** 0.0741 -0.3563 *** 0.0742
6
th decile -0.3027 *** 0.0737 -0.3140 *** 0.0738
7
th decile -0.3408 *** 0.0740 -0.3554 *** 0.0741
8
th decile -0.4660 *** 0.0757 -0.4812 *** 0.0758
9
th decile -0.3523 *** 0.0724 -0.3648 *** 0.0725
10
th decile -0.5161 *** 0.0764 -0.5273 *** 0.0765
Apparent labor productivity in  2001
1
st decile Ref. Ref.
2
nd decile -0.1910 *** 0.0721 -0.1900 *** 0.0721
3
rd decile -0.0972 0.0700 -0.0939 0.0700
4
th decile -0.1906 *** 0.0705 -0.1835 *** 0.0706
5
th decile -0.3208 *** 0.0726 -0.3105 *** 0.0726
6
th decile -0.5000 *** 0.0751 -0.4819 *** 0.0753
7
th decile -0.5753 ***  0.0771 -0.5518 *** 0.0773
8
th decile -0.7505 *** 0.0811 -0.7212 *** 0.081441
9
th decile -0.9623 ***  0.0873 -0.9206 *** 0.0879
10
th decile -1.3672 *** 0.1033 -1.3156 *** 0.1040
Part of women in 2002
1
st quartile Ref. Ref.
2
nd decile 0.2505 *** 0.0465 0.2393 *** 0.0468
3
rd decile 0.3696 ***  0.0531 0.3625 *** 0.0535
4
th quartile 0.3872 ***  0.0626 0.3690 *** 0.0629
Industry
Manufacture of food products -0.2274 *  0.1336 -0.3027 ** 0.1346
Manufacture of consumer goods 1.2365 *** 0.1109 1.2157 *** 0.1112
Manufacture of motor vehicles 1.3698 *** 0.2062 1.3265 *** 0.2066
Manufacture of capital equipment 1.2909 *** 0.1158 1.2749 *** 0.1161
Manufacture of intermediate goods 1.8575 *** 0.1054 1.8131 *** 0.1061
Energy -0.0727 0.5886 -0.0503 0.5886
Construction 0.0704 0.1145 0.0480 0.1152
Wholesale and retail trade; repairing -0.9376 *** 0.1104 -0.9800 *** 0.1108
Transportation 0.3665 *** 0.1267 0.3798 *** 0.1278
Financial intermediation -2.4868 *** 0.5103 -2.3642 *** 0.5110
Real estate activities -1.7358 *** 0.3311 -1.6984 *** 0.3313
Services to firms -0.2324 ** 0.1193 -0.1937 0.1197
Services to individuals -0.3932 *** 0.1106 -0.4712 *** 0.1118
Education. health and social action Ref. Ref.
Part of unskilled workers in 2002
1
st quartile -0.1547 *** 0.0433
Part of high-skilled workers in 2002
4
th quartile -0.1141 ** 0.0508
Intercept -5.0545 *** 0.1433 -4.9118 *** 0.1465
Pseudo R² 0.1637 0.1642
Observations 658,793 
Source: Samples obtained by matching six data sets. 
Field: Establishments from metropolitan France (all industries excepting agriculture and public sector).
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.42
Table 4: The effect of STC on establishment exit 




E0 0.0008 * 0.0002 -0.0013 0.0005 0.0010 0.0058
(0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0036)
E01 0.0060 *** 0.0214 *** 0.0362 *** 0.0189 *** 0.0315 *** 0.0220 ***
(0.0016) (0.0057) (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0076) (0.0077)
E012 0.0097 * 0.0393 *** 0.0479 *** 0.0317 *** 0.0442 *** 0.0276 ***
(0.0058) (0.0080) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0095) (0.0088)
Sample 2
E1 0.0038 ** 0.0211 *** 0.0361 *** 0.0242 *** 0.0301 *** 0.0147 *
(0.0017) (0.0057) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0070) (0.0071)
E12 0.0066 0.0348 *** 0.0406 *** 0.0360*** 0.0455 *** 0.0139
(0.0058) (0.0081) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0085)
Sample 3
E2 -0.0002 0.0211 *** 0.0124 * 0.0181 *** 0.0226 *** 0.0053
(0.0057) (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0064) (0.0069) (0.0053)
Model B
Sample 1
E0 -0.0013 -0.0032 0.0020 0.0055
(0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0036)
E01 0.0315 *** 0.0149 ** 0.0325 *** 0.0306 ***
(0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0075) (0.0076)
E012 0.0435 *** 0.0274 *** 0.0450 *** 0.0328 ***
(0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0094) (0.0088)
Sample 2
E1 0.0327 *** 0.0145 ** 0.0304 *** 0.0207 ***
(0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0070) (0.0070)
E12 0.0378 *** 0.0269 *** 0.0386 *** 0.0260 ***
(0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0083)
Sample 3
E2 0.0170 ** 0.0183 *** 0.0147 *** 0.0028
(0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0070) (0.0054)
Source: Samples obtained by matching six data sets. 
Field: Establishments from metropolitan France (all industries excepting agriculture and public sector).
      * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
      ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
      *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.43










neighbor in a 
radius <0.0001
With replacement 
and the nearest 




E0 -0.0054 -0.0072 -0.0079 -0.0078
(0.0047) (0.0054) (0.0048) (0.0057)
E01 0.01073 0.0107 0.0020 0.0039
(0.0128) (0.0136) (0.0130) (0.0136)
E012 0.0483 *** 0.0465 ** 0.0376 ** 0.0427 **
(0.0174) (0.0183) (0.0174) (0.0184)
Sample 2
E1 0.0233 ** 0.0215 * 0.0179 0.0156
(0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0121)
E12 0.0664 *** 0.0718 *** 0.0636 *** 0.0643 ***
(0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0166) (0.0167)
Sample 3
E2 0.0454 *** 0.0472 *** 0.0412 *** 0.0469 ***
(0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0128)
Model B
Sample 1
E0 -0.0089 -0.0072 -0.0101 -0.0079
(0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0061)
E01 0.0089 0.0179 0.0081 0.0138
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0134) (0.0130)
E012 0.0447 *** 0.0572 0.0423 ** 0.0511 ***
(0.0176) (0.0179) (0.0181) (0.0180)
Sample 2
E1 0.0162 0.0180 0.0121 0.0157
(0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0124)
E12 0.0575 *** 0.0628 *** 0.0544 *** 0.0626 ***
(0.0167) (0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0175)
Sample 3
E2 0.03781 *** 0.0416 *** 0.0397 *** 0.0488 ***
(0.0133) (0.0136) (0.0133) (0.0138)
Source: Samples obtained by matching six data sets.
Field: Establishments from metropolitan France (all industries excepting agriculture and public sector).
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.44










neighbor in a 
radius <0.0001
With replacement 
and the nearest 




E0 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0014
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0027)
E01 0.0354 *** 0.0368 *** 0.0355 *** 0.0362 ***
(0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0066)
E012 0.0530 *** 0.0499 *** 0.0512 *** 0.0480 ***
(0.0083) (0.0087) (0.0083) (0.0087)
Sample 2
E1 0.0369 *** 0.0364 *** 0.0368 *** 0.0362 ***
(0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0063)
E12 0.0478 *** 0.0414 *** 0.0464 *** 0.0407 ***
(0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0086)
Sample 3
E2 0.0207 *** 0.0155 *** 0.0180 *** 0.0124 *
(0.0065) (0.0068) (0.0065) (0.0068)
Model B
Sample 1
E0 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0014
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0027)
E01 0.0296 *** 0.0307 *** 0.0297 *** 0.0315 ***
(0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0067)
E012 0.0434 *** 0.0431 *** 0.0428 *** 0.0435 ***
(0.0084) (0.0087) (0.0085) (0.0087)
Sample 2
E1 0.0308 *** 0.03134 *** 0.0312 *** 0.0328 ***
(0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0063)
E12 0.0414 *** 0.0383 *** 0.0396 *** 0.0379 ***
(0.0083) (0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0086)
Sample 3
E2 0.0204 *** 0.0186 *** 0.0193 *** 0.0171 **
(0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0066)
Source: Samples obtained by matching six data sets.
Field: Establishments from metropolitan France (all industries excepting agriculture and public sector).
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.45










neighbor in a 
radius <0.0001
With replacement 
and the nearest 
neighbor in a 
radius <0.0001
STC plus subsample / Model B
Sample 2
E1 0.0359 *** 0.0359 *** 0.0355 *** 0.0353 ***
(0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0071)
E12 0.0452 *** 0.0472 *** 0.0434 *** 0.0432 ***
(0.0098) (0.0100) (0.0099) (0.0101)
STC minus subsample / Model B
Sample 2
E1 0.0375 *** 0.0393 *** 0.0369 *** 0.0378 ***
(0.0117) (0.0121) (0.012) (0.012)
E12 0.0473 *** 0.0446 *** 0.0452 *** 0.0414 ***
(0.0151) (0.0155) (0.0152) (0.0156)
Source: Samples obtained by matching six data sets. 
Field: Establishments from metropolitan France (all industries excepting agriculture and public sector).
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.46










neighbor in a 
radius <0.0001
With replacement 
and the nearest 
neighbor in a 
radius <0.0001
STC plus 2000-2005 subsample / Model B
Sample 2
E1 0.0312 *** 0.0344 *** 0.0325 *** 0.0322 ***
(0.0010) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0098)
E12 0.0430 *** 0.0445 *** 0.0475 *** 0.0488 ***
(0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0139)
STC minus 2000-2005 subsample / Model B
Sample 2
E1 0.0454 *** 0.0472 *** 0.0383 ** 0.0383 **
(0.0164) (0.0171) (0.0166) (0.0166)
E12 0.0544 ** 0.0454 ** 0.0479 ** 0.0479 **
(0.0216) (0.0226) (0.0222) (0.0222)
Source: Samples obtained by matching six data sets.
Field: Establishments from metropolitan France (all industries excepting agriculture and public sector).
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.47
Appendix 1: Distribution of establishment and firm characteristics according to the STC 






Less than 20 employees 88.99 67.64
20-49 employees 7.34 16.99
50-499 employees 3.56 14.77
500 employees and more 0.11 0.60
Establishment age
1
st quartile 27.88 21.05
2
nd quartile 22.15 19.74
3
rd quartile 23.67 24.43
4
th quartile 26.30 34.78
For-profit firm 68.42 82.51
Geographic location
Ile-de-France  18.32 7.25
Centre North 16.77 21.69
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 5.25 7.05
East 8.57 9.36
North West Atlantic 13.16 11.03
South West 11.97 8.81
Centre South 13.27 21.11
Midi Mediterranean 12.69 13.70
Value added variation rate in 2002
1
st decile 9.90 28.14
2
nd decile 9.95 17.81
3
rd decile 10.00 10.90
4
th decile 12.34 10.90
5
th decile 7.69 6.64
6
th decile 10.01 5.33
7
th decile 10.03 4.97
8
th decile 10.03 4.83
9
th decile 10.03 4.53
10
th decile 10.02 5.96
Value added variation rate in 2001
1
st decile 9.97 15.23
2
nd decile 9.98 13.26
3
rd decile 9.99 11.12
4
th decile 10.00 9.61
5
th decile 10.00 8.65
6
th decile 10.01 8.84
7
th decile 9.98 8.67
8
th decile 10.04 7.93
9
th decile 10.01 9.11
10
th decile 10.01 7.58
Apparent labor productivity in  2001
1
st decile 9.99 11.58
2
nd decile 9.99 10.90
3
rd decile 9.99 13.23
4
th decile 10.16 13.45
5
th decile 9.81 12.38
6
th decile 9.89 10.79
7
th decile 10.11 9.77 
8
th decile 10.01 8.02
9
th decile 10.01 6.18
10
th decile 10.04 3.71
Part of women in 2002
1
st quartile 25.01 23.5548
2
nd decile 25.02 35.68
3
rd decile 25.01 24.95
4
th quartile 24.96 15.81
Part of unskilled workers in 2002
1
st quartile 37.77 27.64
2
nd decile 12.24 21.19
3
rd decile 24.95 34.56
4
th quartile 25.05 16.61
Part of high-skilled workers in 2002
1
st quartile 42.27 26.19
2
nd decile 7.78 15.23
3
rd decile 24.90 42.63
4
th quartile 25.05 15.95
Industry
Manufacture of food products 4.74 3.24
Manufacture of consumer goods 3.00 10.49
Manufacture of motor vehicles 0.20 0.91
Manufacture of capital equipment 2.83 9.28
Manufacture of intermediate goods 4.81 33.43
Energy 0.15 0.08
Construction 14.08 10.38
Wholesale and retail trade; repairing 31.45 9.58
Transportation 3.73 4.58
Financial intermediation 1.64 0.11
Real estate activities 2.07 0.27
Services to firms 10.28 5.60
Services to individuals 15.48 8.81
Education. health and social action 5.53 3.24
Restructuring in 2002 1.05 0.55
Restructuring in 2001 1.45 1.70
Observations 655,150 3,643
Source: Samples obtained by matching six data sets.
Field: Establishments from metropolitan France (all industries excepting 
agriculture and public sector). 49
Appendix 2: Test of standardized differences (year 2002, sample 1, Model B)
Variable Situation
Mean % bias t-test
Treated     Untreated reduction
t    p> t
Size
20-49 Without matching 0.16991   0.07338 22.22  0.000
With matching 0.16769   0.15737 89.3 1.18  0.236
50-499 Without matching 0.14768   0.03559 36.15  0.000
With matching 0.13923   0.13393 95.3 0.65  0.513
500 + Without matching 0.00604   0.00114 8.62  0.000
With matching 0.00586   0.00335 48.7 1.57  0.116
FORPROFIT Without matching 0.82514   0.68416 18.27  0.000
With matching 0.82227   0.82227 100.0 0.00  1.000
RESTRUCTt Without matching 0.00549   0.01052 -2.97  0.003
With matching 0.00558   0.00586 94.4 -0.16  0.876
RESTRUCTt-1 Without matching 0.01702   0.01451 1.26  0.207
With matching 0.01674   0.02121 -77.9 -1.39  0.166
QUARTILE_AGE4 Without matching 0.34779   0.26296 11.59  0.000
With matching 0.34431   0.33147 84.9 1.15  0.251
Region
REG2 Without matching 0.21685    0.16770 7.91  0.000
With matching 0.21456   0.21289 96.6 0.17  0.863
REG3 Without matching 0.07055   0.05254 4.85  0.000
With matching 0.07031   0.06473 69.0 0.94  0.347
REG4 Without matching 0.09360   0.08566 1.71  0.088
With matching 0.09431   0.09096 57.9 0.49  0.625
REG5 Without matching 0.11035   0.13155 -3.78  0.000
With matching 0.11105   0.10798 85.5 0.42  0.677
REG6 Without matching 0.08811   0.11972 -5.86  0.000
With matching 0.08929   0.08789 95.6 0.21  0.835
REG7 Without matching 0.21109   0.13274 13.88  0.000
With matching 0.20787   0.21038 96.8 -0.26  0.794
REG8 Without matching 0.13698   0.12689 1.82  0.068
With matching 0.13895   0.15067 -16.3 -1.41  0.159
Var_VA t
DECILE2 Without matching 0.17815   0.09952 15.78  0.000
With matching 0.17969   0.17941 99.6 0.03  0.975
DECILE3 Without matching 0.10898    0.1 1.80  0.072
With matching 0.11077    0.1144 59.6 -0.49  0.627
DECILE4 Without matching 0.10898   0.12336 -2.63  0.008
With matching 0.11049   0.10938 92.2 0.15  0.880
DECILE5 Without matching 0.06643   0.07688 -2.36  0.018
With matching 0.06752   0.06334 60.0 0.72  0.474
DECILE6 Without matching 0.05325   0.10014 -9.41  0.000
With matching 0.05413   0.05078 92.9 0.64  0.525
DECILE7 Without matching 0.04968   0.10029 -10.15  0.000
With matching 0.05050   0.05246 96.1 -0.37  0.708
DECILE8 Without matching 0.04831   0.10031 -10.43  0.000
With matching 0.04911   0.05329 92.0 -0.80  0.422
DECILE9 Without matching 0.04529   0.10028 -11.03  0.000
With matching 0.04604   0.04799 96.4 -0.39  0.696
DECILE10 Without matching 0.05957   0.10022 -8.16  0.000
With matching 0.06055   0.05776 93.1 0.50  0.61750
Var_Va t-1
DECILE2 Without matching 0.13258   0.09982 6.57  0.000
With matching 0.13253   0.14593 59.1 -1.64  0.102
DECILE3 Without matching 0.11117   0.09995 2.25  0.024
With matching 0.11077   0.11161 92.5 -0.11  0.910
DECILE4 Without matching 0.09607   0.10005 -0.80  0.425
With matching 0.09682   0.09319 8.7 0.52  0.601
DECILE5 Without matching 0.08647   0.10004 -2.72  0.006
With matching 0.08705    0.0784 36.3 1.33  0.184
DECILE6 Without matching 0.08839   0.10006 -2.34  0.019
With matching 0.08956   0.09319 68.9 -0.53  0.594
DECILE7 Without matching 0.08674   0.09981 -2.63  0.009
With matching 0.08622   0.08231 70.1 0.60  0.552
DECILE8 Without matching 0.07933   0.10038 -4.22  0.000
With matching 0.08064   0.08092 98.7 -0.04  0.965
DECILE9 Without matching 0.09113   0.10012 -1.80  0.071
With matching 0.09208   0.09905 22.4 -1.00  0.315
DECILE10 Without matching 0.07576   0.10006 -4.88  0.000
With matching 0.07645   0.07478 93.1 0.27  0.789
LP t-1
DECILE2 Without matching 0.10898   0.09994 1.81  0.070
With matching 0.10854   0.11328 47.5 -0.64  0.523
DECILE3 Without matching 0.13231   0.09989 6.50  0.000
With matching 0.13030   0.13309 91.4 -0.35  0.727
DECILE4 Without matching 0.13450  0.10158 6.55  0.000
With matching 0.13421   0.12444 70.3 1.23  0.218
DECILE5 Without matching 0.12380   0.09808 5.20  0.000
With matching 0.12388   0.12137 90.2 0.32  0.746
DECILE6 Without matching 0.10788   0.09891 1.81  0.071
With matching 0.10854   0.11691 6.7 -1.12  0.263
DECILE7 Without matching 0.09772   0.10106 -0.67  0.505
With matching 0.09794   0.10435 -92.4 -0.90  0.368
DECILE8 Without matching 0.08015   0.10011 -4.00  0.000
With matching 0.08119   0.08147 98.6 -0.04  0.966
DECILE9 Without matching 0.06176   0.10015 -7.70  0.000
With matching 0.06250    0.0639 96.4 -0.24  0.808
DECILE10 Without matching 0.03706   0.10041 -12.71  0.000
With matching 0.03767   0.03627 97.8 0.31  0.754
Women t
QUARTILE2 Without matching 0.35685   0.25019 14.81  0.000
With matching 0.35770   0.36551 92.7 -0.69  0.491
QUARTILE3 Without matching 0.24952   0.25009 -0.08  0.937
With matching 0.24498   0.23884 -977.5 0.61  0.544
QUARTILE4 Without matching 0.15811   0.24958 -12.73  0.000
With matching 0.15960   0.15765 97.9 0.23  0.821
Industry
SECT1 Without matching 0.03239   0.04743 -4.26  0.000
With matching 0.03292   0.03209 94.4 0.20  0.842
SECT2 Without matching 0.10486   0.03004 26.22  0.000
With matching 0.10603   0.09403 84.0 1.69  0.091
SECT3 Without matching 0.00906   0.00197 9.54  0.000
With matching 0.00921   0.00837 88.2 0.38  0.704
SECT4 Without matching 0.09278   0.02835 23.24  0.00051
With matching 0.09375   0.08817 91.3 0.82  0.411
SECT5 Without matching 0.33434   0.04806 79.71  0.000
With matching 0.32450   0.34542 92.7 -1.88  0.061
SECT6 Without matching 0.00082   0.00149 -1.04  0.300
With matching 0.00084   0.00056 57.8 0.45  0.655
SECT7 Without matching 0.10376   0.14083 -6.42  0.000
With matching 0.10547   0.10575 99.2 -0.04  0.969
SECT8 Without matching 0.09580   0.31446 -28.39  0.000
With matching 0.09738   0.101 98.3 -0.51  0.608
SECT9 Without matching 0.04584    0.0373 2.71  0.007
With matching 0.0466   0.05636 -14.4 -1.87  0.061
SECT10 Without matching 0.0011   0.01642 -7.28  0.000
With matching 0.00112   0.00056 96.4 0.82  0.414
SECT11 Without matching 0.00274   0.02074 -7.62  0.000
With matching 0.00279   0.00195 95.3 0.73  0.466
SECT12 Without matching 0.05600   0.10279 -9.28  0.000
With matching 0.05692   0.04576 76.1 2.14  0.032
SECT13 Without matching 0.08811   0.15483 -11.11  0.000
With matching 0.08956    0.0971 88.7 -1.10  0.273
Unskilled workers
QUARTILE 1 Without matching 0.27642   0.37768 -12.58  0.000
With matching 0.28041   0.27902 98.6 0.13  0.895
High-skilled 
workers
QUARTILE 4 Without matching 0.15948    0.2505 -12.65  0.000
With matching 0.162110  0.15151 88.4 1.23  0.217
Source: Samples obtained by matching six data sets.
Field: Establishments from metropolitan France (all industries excepting agriculture and public sector). 